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In this paper I try to move away from the Extreme Bounds method of identifying “robust”
empirical relations in the economic growth literature.  Instead of analyzing the extreme bounds of
the estimates of the coefficient of a particular variable, I analyze the entire distribution.  My claim
in this paper is that, if we do this, the picture emerging from the empirical growth literature is not
the pessimistic “Nothing is Robust” that we get with the extreme bound analysis.  Instead, we find
that a substantial number of variables can be found to be strongly related to growth.
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I have had useful conversations with Robert Barro, Casey Mulligan, and Chris Sims, and I thank
them profoundly for that. I also benefited from Manuel Arellano, Fabio Canova, Juanjo Dolado,
Kate Howe, Ed Leamer, Albert Marcet, Jane Marrinan, Rafa Repullo, Cava de Santsadurni, Albert
Satorra, and Etsuro Shioji.  This paper started when I was visiting Universitat Pompeu Fabra in
the Spring of 1996 and the International Monetary Fund in the summer of 1996  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1#x1 ￿ ￿2#x2 ￿ ... ￿ ￿n#xn ￿ ￿
  Recently, a number of authors have broken up the period of analysis into various sub-
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periods and have estimated the same type of regressions using panel techniques.
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(1) INTRODUCTION
Following the seminal work of Barro (1991), the recent empirical literature on economic
growth has identified a substantial number of variables that are partially correlated with the rate of
economic growth.  The basic methodology consists of running cross-sectional regressions of the
form
1
        (1)
where ￿ is the vector of rates of economic growth, and x ...,x  are vectors of explanatory variables 1, n
which vary across researchers and across papers.  Each paper typically reports a (possibly non-
random) sample of the regressions actually run by the researcher. Variables like the initial level of
income, the investment rate, various measures of education, some policy indicators and many
other variables have been found to be significantly correlated with growth in regressions like (1). 
I have collected around 60 variables which have been found to be significant in at least one
regression.  
The problem faced by empirical growth economists is that growth theories are not explicit
enough about what variables x belong in the “true” regression.  That is, even if we know that the j
“true” model looks like (1), we do not know exactly what variables x we should use.  One reason j
is that economic growth theory is not explicit about what variables matter for growth.  For
example, almost all growth theories say that the “level of technology” [the constant “A” in
Y=AF(K,L)] is an important determinant of growth.  Neoclassical theories say that the level of A
affects the growth rate along a transition towards the no-growth steady state.  Endogenous growth
theory says that A affects the steady-state growth rate. But whether it has a temporary or a
permanent effect on growth, we all agree that A affects the growth rate.  From a macroeconomic
perspective, there are a lot of things other than the “engineering” level of technology, which can
be thought of as “level of technology”, A.  In other words, there are many things that may affect
the aggregate amount of output, given the aggregate amount of inputs.  These may include market
distortions, distortionary taxes, maintenance of property rights, degree of monopoly, weather,￿ ￿ ￿j ￿ ￿yj# y ￿ ￿zj# z ￿ ￿xj# xj￿ ￿
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attitudes towards work, and so on.  A good theorist could make almost any variable affect the
level of technology in this broad sense and, as a result, he could make almost any variable look
like an important theoretical determinant of the rate of economic growth.  This is the same as
saying that the theory is silent when it comes to providing much guidance in our search for the
“true” explanatory variables. 
Another problem is that, even if theory was clear in pointing to the important “theoretical
determinants” of growth, the empirical estimation of these determinants is not immediate.  For
example, we may have a theory that says that human capital is important for growth.  How do we
measure human capital?  There are lots of imperfect measures and it is not clear a priori which one
is better.  Other theories may point to “efficient government” as a key to economic growth.  How
do we measure that?  How do we compare “inefficient bureaucracies” across countries? How do
we compare “degrees of corruption in the government” across countries?  And even if we could
measure both the level of “inefficient bureaucracy” and the “degree of corruption in the
government”, which one is a better measure “efficient government”?  
All this has led empirical economists to follow theory loosely and simply “try” various
variables relating the various potentially important determinants of growth.   However, as soon as
one starts running regressions combining the various variables one soon finds that variable x  is 1
significant when the regression includes variables x  and x , but it becomes non-significant when 23
x  is included. Since we don’t know a priori the “true” variables that should be included, we are 4
left with the question: what are the variables that are really correlated with growth? 
An initial answer to this question was given by Levine and Renelt (1992).  They applied
Leamer’s (1983, 1985) extreme bounds test to identify “robust” empirical relations in the
economic growth literature.  In short, the extreme bounds test works as follows: Imagine that we
have a pool of N variables that have been previously identified to be related to growth and we are
interested in knowing whether variable z is “robust”.   We would estimate regressions of the form:
           (2) 
where y is a vector of fixed variables that always appear in the regressions (in the Levine and
Renelt paper, these variables are the initial level of income, the investment rate, the secondary  Note that this amounts to saying that if one finds ONE regression for which the sign of
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the coefficient ￿  changes, or becomes insignificant, then the variable is not robust.   z
3
school enrollment rate and the rate of population growth), z is the variable of interest and x ￿ X is j
a vector of up to three variables taken from the pool X of N variables available.  One needs to
estimate this regression or model for the M possible combinations of x￿X.  For each model j, one j
finds an estimate, ￿ , and the corresponding standard deviation, ) .   The lower extreme bound is zj zj
defined to be the lowest value of ￿ -2)  and the upper extreme bound is defined to be the largest zj zj
value of ￿ +2) .  The extreme bounds test for variable z says that if the lower extreme bound is zj zj
negative and the upper extreme bound is positive, then variable z is not robust.  
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Not surprisingly, Levine and Renelt’s conclusion is that very few (or no) variables are
robust.  One possible reason for finding few or no robust variables is, of course, that very few
variables can be identified to be correlated systematically with growth.  Hence, some researcher’s
reading of the Levine and Renelt paper concluded that “nothing can be learned from this
empirical growth literature because no variables are robustly correlated with growth”.  Another
explanation, however, is that the test is too strong for any variable to really pass it:  if the
distribution of the estimators of ￿  has some positive and some negative support, then one is z
bound to find one regression for which the estimated coefficient changes signs if enough
regressions are run.  Thus, giving the label of non-robust to all variables is all but guaranteed. 
This problem is especially strong if one considers that a lot of the variables used in the literature
reflect similar economic phenomena so multicollinearity among variables is considerable.  Hence,
instead of rejecting the theory (or the data), one is tempted to reject the test! 
(2) MOVING AWAY FROM EXTREME TESTS
In this paper I want to move away from this “extreme test”.  In fact, I want to depart from
the zero-one labeling variables of ”robust” vs. “non-robust” and, instead, I want to assign some
level of confidence to each of the variables.  One way to move away from the extreme bounds test
is to look at the whole distribution of the estimators of ￿ .  In particular, we might be interested in zˆ ￿z










 Zero divides the area under the density in two.  For the rest of the paper, and in order to
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economize on space, the LARGER of the two areas will be called “CDF(0)”, regardless of
whether this is the area above zero or below zero (in other words, regardless of whether this is the
CDF(0) or 1-CDF(0).)   Hence, what I call CDF(0) will always be a number between 0.50 and 1.  
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the fraction of the cumulative distribution function lying on each side of zero . The immediate
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problem is that we do not know the exact form of this distribution.  Hence, I will operate under
two different assumptions.
(A) Case 1: The distribution of the estimates of ￿  across models is normal.  When the z
density function is normal, we need to compute the mean and the standard deviation of this
distribution.  For each of the M models, we compute the (integrated) likelihood, L, the point j
estimate ￿ , and the standard deviation ) .  With all these numbers we will construct the mean zj zj
estimate of   as the weighted average each of the M point estimates, ￿ ,  zj
    (4) 
where the weights, 7 , are proportional to the (integrated) likelihoods:  zj
    (5) 
The reason for using this weighting scheme is that we want to give more weight to the regressions
or models that are more likely to be the true model. To the extent that the fit of model j is an
indication of its probability of being the true model, a likelihood-weighted scheme like the one
proposed here should be reasonable. The weighted mean for each of the 59 variables of interest is
reported in Column (4) of Table 1.
I also compute the average variance as the weighted average of the M estimated variances,





















           (6)
The (square root of this) variance is reported in Table 1's Column (5).  Once we know the mean
and the variance of the normal distribution, we compute the CDF(0) using the normal tables,
which we report it in Column (6).  
(B) Case 2:  The  distribution of the estimates of ￿  across models is NOT normal.  If the  z
distribution is not normal, we can still compute its CDF(0) as follows: For each of the M
regressions, I will compute the area under the density function to the right of zero which I denote
by  . We then compute the aggregate CDF(0) of ￿  as the weighted average of all z
the individual , where the weights are, again, the integrated likelihoods (5).  In
other words:
  
     (7) 
The computed weighted CDF(0) is reported in Column (7) in Table 1. 
A potential problem with this method is that it is possible that the goodness of fit of model
j may not be a good indicator of the probability that model j is the true model.   This might
happen, for example, when some explanatory variables in our data set are endogenous:  Models
with endogenous variables may have a (spurious) better fit.  Thus, the weights given to these
models will tend to be larger and, in fact, they may very well dominate our estimates in Columns
(4) through (7).  We may find that only one or two of the models get almost all of the weight in
our estimated weighted average and these one or two models may suffer from endogeneity bias.
One could argue that, when this is a serious problem, the unweighted average of all the  models
may be superior to the weighted averages proposed here.  As a way of comparison, Column (8)0
NW
z (0) ￿ M
M
j￿1




  Levine and Renelt allow the remaining N variables to be combined in sets of UP TO
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three variables.  I will only allow for sets of exactly three variables.  The reason is that regressions
with more variables will tend to fit better and, as a result, get a larger weight in my estimations of
equations (4) and (6).  One way to solve this problem would be to introduce some kind of penalty
for models involving more explanatory variables.  Another solution is to restrict all the models to
have the same number of explanatory variables.  
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presents the simple average of the M CDF(0)s:  
       (8)
(3)  SPECIFICATION AND DATA
Specification
Even though I depart from Levine and Renelt when it comes to “testing” variables, I keep their
specification in the sense that I am going to estimate models like (2).  Model j combines some
fixed variables which appear in all regressions, y, the variable of interest, z, with the trio x taken j
from the pool X of the remaining variables proposed in the literature.   The reason for keeping
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some fixed variables in all regressions and the reason for allowing the remaining variables to come
only in trios is that the typical growth regression in the literature has (at least) seven right hand
side variables.  I found a total of 63 variables in the literature plus the growth rate of GDP
(throughout the paper, the only dependent variable is the average growth rate of per capita GDP
between 1960 and 1992).  If I tested one variable and allowed the remaining 62 to be combined in
groups of 6, I would have to estimate 61 million regressions per variable tested.  This would sum
to a total of 3.9 billion regressions.  My computer can estimate about 2,000 regressions per minute
so it would take about 4 years to estimate all these models.  In the second part of the paper I will
allow for eight explanatory variables.  If I combine the 62 remaining variables in groups of 7
instead of 6, then I would have to run a total of 30 billion regressions and it would take me 29
years! Since I am not currently equipped to wait 29 years, I decided NOT to allow for
combinations of 7 variables taken from the pool of 62.  A possible alternative was to run
regressions with only three or four explanatory variables (and no fixed variables). The problem
then would be that a lot of (and possibly all of) the regressions would be clearly misspecified  Even combining the remaining variables in sets of 4 at a time (rather than sets of 3)
5
would be a large problem: it would entail estimating 26 million regressions which would take
about 9 days in my computer.  
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(missing important variables is more of a problem than introducing irrelevant variables). Instead
of waiting for 29 years or misspecifying all the regressions, I decided to follow Levine and Renelt
and allow all the models to include three fixed variables which we may consider a priori to be
important determinants of growth.  When we combine these three variables along with the tested
variable and then with trios of the remaining 59 variables I always have regressions with seven
explanatory variables.   
5 
Data
A lot more than 63 variables have been used in the literature. From all of these I choose 63
variables by keeping mostly the variables that can in some ways represent “state variables” of a
dynamic optimization problem.  Hence, I choose variables measured as close as possible to the
beginning of the sample period (which is 1960) and eliminate all those variables that were
computed for the later years only.  For example, of all the education variables computed by Barro
and Lee (1995), I only use the values for 1960.  I also neglect some of the political variables that
were published for the late 1980s, even though these variables have been put forward by a number
of researchers (in this category, for example, I neglect the Knack and Keefer’s bureaucracy and
corruption variables, which were computed for 1985 only; corruption and bad bureaucracy could
very well be the endogenous response of a poor economic performance between 1960 and 1985).  
Finally, I also keep some variables, not because they are good proxies for some initial state
variable but because they are proxies for some “parameters” of some models.  For example, the
Solow-Swan model assumes that the “savings rate” is a fundamental (exogenous) determinant of
the transitional growth rate (and so are the rate of population growth, the depreciation rate, and the
level of technology.)  One way to measure the savings rate is to use the average savings rate over
the period of analysis (1960-1992).  I reluctantly use some variables of this sort (the average
savings or investment rate and the DeLong and Summers measures of equipment and non-
equipment investment are examples in this category). The reason for being reluctant to the
inclusion of such variables is that these may be “more endogenous” than the variables measured at8
the beginning of the period.  
With these restrictions, the total size of the data set becomes 63 variables plus the growth
rate of GDP per capita between 1960 and 1992. 
Choosing the Fixed Variables 
The next thing I need to do is to choose the three fixed variables (that is, the variables that
appear in all regressions.)  These variables need to have some properties: they have to be widely
used in the literature, they have to be variables evaluated in the beginning of the period (1960) and
they have to be somewhat “robust” in the sense that they systematically seem to matter in all
regressions run in the previous literature. The main obvious candidate to become a fixed variable
is the level of income in 1960.  All the regressions I know of in the literature include the initial
level of income and it is usually found to be significantly negative (this is the conditional
convergence effect).  The other two variables chosen are the life expectancy in 1960 and the
primary school enrollment rate in 1960.  Life expectancy is a measure of non-educational human
capital that is also often used and usually found to be significant.  The primary school enrollment
rate in 1960 was one of the first important variables identified by Barro (1991) and it has been
widely used, although its success has been mixed.  
One of the variables that is most widely used in the literature (and one of the fixed
variables in the Levine and Renelt paper) is the average investment rate.  The interpretation of the
partial correlation between growth and a variable is different depending on whether the investment
rate is in the regression or not.  If the investment is in the regression and variable x is correlated
with growth, we tend to think that variable x affects the “level of efficiency” in the sense that it
has effects on growth “above and beyond its effects on the incentives to invest”.  If variable x is
correlated with growth when investment is not held constant, then we do not know whether
variable x affects growth directly or through the incentives to save and invest.  Although this
partial correlation interpretation can be made of any variable, the distinction in the case of
investment appears to be much more significant given the central role that investment plays in
growth theory. In order to make the distinction, I will estimate the whole set of close to 30,000
regressions first without the investment rate appearing in ANY of the regressions and then with  Another possibility is that, for each variable, there is only one model that takes all the
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weight.  Since each of the individual models is close to normal, a weighted average where one
models gets all the weight will also be normal. 
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the investment rate as a fixed variable.    
In summary, I have a total of 63 variables.  In the first part of the paper I neglect the
average investment rate over the period 1960-1992 so I am left with 62 variables.  I use three of
them as fixed variables so, for each variable tested I combine the remaining 58 variables in sets of
three.  Hence, for each variable I estimate M=30,856 (M=58!/[3!55!]) models. 
(4) RESULTS
Table 1 reports some summary results.  For the interested reader, Columns (1) and (2)
report the “two extreme bounds”  (as defined in the previous section) for each of the 59 variables
of interest. Inspection of Columns (1) and (2) of Table 1 shows that for 58 of the 59 variables, the
lower extreme bound is negative and the upper extreme bound is positive.  Thus, we should label
all but one of the variables as non-robust.  The exception is the fraction of the population that
follows the Confucius religion.  This variable takes the value zero for most countries, the
exception being the East Asian miracles (among very few others).  Hence, this acts pretty much a
dummy variable for East Asian miracle economies.  
Column (3) reports the fraction of the 30,856 regressions in which the tested variable was
significantly different from zero (defined as a t-statistic with an absolute value larger than two.) 
We see that there are a few variables that were significant 90 or even 99 percent of the time while
others were significant less than 1 percent of the time.  The extreme bounds test, however, gave
them all the same label: non-robust.  
The first interesting result reported in Table 1 comes from the comparison of Columns (6)
and (7).  Column (6) reports the CDF(0) under the assumption that the distribution of the
estimators of ￿  is normal while Column (7) does not assume normality.  The correlation between z
these two columns is 0.98, which can be interpreted as an indication that the density function of
the estimates of ￿  is fairly close to normal. z
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Variables that are Strongly Correlated with Growth
Column (4) reports the estimate of the weighted average of ￿  for each variable z.  This z
column can be used to check the sign of the partial correlation between the variable and growth. 
If we look at Column (7), we see that 21 of the 59 variables have a CDF(0) above 0.95. If
we take 95 percent to be the usual level of significance, we could say that 21 out of the 59
variables appear to be “significant”.  
(1) Regional Variables: Sub-Saharan Africa,  Latin American, (negatively related to growth) and
Absolute Latitude (far away from the equator is good for growth).  These variables are from the
Barro and Lee (1993) data set. 
(2) Political Variables:  Rule of Law, Political Rights, and Civil Liberties, (good for growth).
Number of Revolutions and Military Coups, and War Dummy (bad for growth). All of these from
the Barro and Lee (1993) data set. I should note that the Political Rights and Civil Liberties
variables are measured “backwards” in the sense that they take larger values for countries with
less political rights and less civil liberties.  Hence, the negative coefficients corresponding to these
variables in Column (4) do not mean that less rights and less liberties are associated with more
growth.     
(3) Religious Variables:   Confucius, Buddhist and Muslim (positive) and Protestant and Catholic
(negative) (all of them from Barro (1996).) Some of these religious variables tend to be more like
regional dummies because they take a zero value for most countries.  Most notably, the Fraction
of Confucius and Buddhist are more like dummies for East Asian miracles.  Among the religious
variables we note Muslim has a positive coefficient and Protestant and Catholic are negative.  I
am not sure whether we should interpret these results strictly along religious lines or whether to
think of these religion variables as proxies for some other regional phenomenon (for example, the
Muslim variable may be correlated with oil production).
(4) Market Distortions and Market Performance: Real Exchange Rate Distortions and Standard11
Deviation of the Black Market Premium (both from Barro and Lee (1993) and both negative). The
real exchange rate distortions represents distortions in the foreign sector.  The Standard Deviation
of the Black Market Premium is often interpreted as a sign of economic uncertainty which should
tend to discourage investment. 
(5) Types of Investment: The distinction between Equipment and Non-Equipment investment has
been emphasized recently by DeLong and Summers (1991).  In Table 1 we note that both
Equipment Investment and Non-Equipment Investment are positive (although, as predicted by
DeLong and Summers, the coefficient for this variable (￿=0.0562) is about one fourth the
coefficient for Equipment Investment (￿=0.2175).)  
(6) Primary Sector Production: Sachs and Warner’s (1995) fraction of primary products in total
exports (negative) and Hall and Jones (1996) fraction of GDP in mining (positive). I am not sure
that a direct Sachs and Warner interpretation can be applied to this contradictory finding. 
(7) Openness: Sachs and Warner (1996) “number of years an economy has been open between
1950 and 1990” (positive).  Surprisingly, among the various measures of openness proposed in
the literature and included in my data set, only this one appears to be strongly correlated with
growth.
(8) Type of Economic Organization. Hall and Jones’s (1996) Degree of Capitalism based on a
classification made by Freedom House (1994).  The variable Degree of Capitalism gives countries
one of six values according to how important private enterprise is in the organization of the
economy. The categories and their corresponding values are: 0=statist (Iraq or Ethiopia belong in
this category), 1=mixed statist (Egypt, Rwanda), 2=mixed capitalist-statist (Malta), 3=capitalist-
statist (Italy, India), 4=mixed-capitalist (Greece, Senegal), and 5=capitalist (USA, Botswana). 
Column 4 suggests that the closer to capitalist the economy is, the more it grows.  Columns 6 and
7 suggest that this correlation is quite strong.12
(9) Former Spanish Colonies.  This variable is significant according to Column (6) and borderline
if we look at Column (7).  I could provide a number of first-hand explanations for this
phenomenon, but that would get me in trouble, so I will leave it to the reader to reach his own
explanation.
Variables that are NOT Strongly Correlated with Growth
The reader can go over the list and see what his favorite variable is and how it scores and
compares with the rest of the variables reported in the literature.  It is interesting to note some
variables that appear NOT to be important:  no measure of government spending (including
investment) appears to affect growth in a significant way.  The various measures of financial
sophistication also fail to appear significant. The inflation rate and its variance do not appear to
matter much although, in fairness to the authors who proposed these variables, I should say that
they specifically say that they affect growth in a non-linear ways (and my analysis allows these
variables to enter in a linear fashion only).  Other variables that do not seem to matter include
various measures of scale effects (measured by total area and total labor force), various measures
of openness (outward orientation, tariff restrictions, black market premium, free trade openness)
and the recently publicized “ethno-linguistic fractionalization” (which is supposed to capture the
degree to which there are internal fights among various ethnic groups).
Non-Weighted Results
As mentioned earlier, the likelihood-weights used up to now are valid only to the extent
that all the models are true regression models.  If, for some reason, some models have spurious
good fits, then a non-weighted scheme may be superior.  Column (8) reports the non-weighted
CDF(0) as defined in Equation (8).  A rapid comparison of Columns (7) and (8) suggests that the
weighted results by and large go through when we do not use weights.  Only four variables which
are above the magic line of 0.95 according to the weighted CDF(0) drop below that mark when we
use an unweighted average of the individual CDF(0)’s.  These variables are Civil Liberties,
Revolutions and Coups, Fraction of GDP in Mining, and the War Dummy.  This means that, for
each of these four variables, a single model (or a small set of models) has a likelihood much larger13
than the rest so it gets all the weight in the weighted average.  Hence, the weighted average seems
to be significant even though most of the regressions are not so that the unweighted average is not
significant.  On the other side, only one variable with a CDF(0) above 0.95 in Column (8) gets a
CDF(0) below 0.95 in Column (7): the Ratio of Liquid Liabilities to GDP (which is a measure of
the degree of financial development).  
(5)  ANALYSIS OF THE FIXED VARIABLES
In order to gain some confidence on the fixed variables which have appeared in all regressions, we
now repeat the whole procedure by allowing each of the fixed variables to be just like a regular
tested variable, z, while keeping the other two fixed variables in all regressions and allowing for
combinations of three chosen among the remaining 59 (since now the pool of remaining variables
is 59 rather than 58, we have M= 32,509 models per variable). The results are reported in the last
three rows of Table 1.   
Log(GDP ):  60
The first fixed variable is the log of GDP per capita in 1960. This variable is often introduced in
growth regressions to capture the concept of conditional convergence introduced by Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1992).  Since the sign of the lower extreme bound (Column 1) is negative and the
upper extreme bound (Column 2) is positive, the extreme bounds test would give this variable the
label of “Non-Robust”.  However, a quick look at Column 3 shows that the initial level of income
is significant in 99.98 of the regressions run (in fact, it is significant in ALL BUT 7 of the 32,509
regressions!)
The estimated coefficient for the initial level of income is ￿  = -0.0133, which implies a y0
speed of convergence of 1.8 percent per year!!! Moreover, columns(6), (7), and (8) suggest that
the initial level of income is strongly correlated with growth, regardless of whether we assume that
the  distribution is normal or non-normal, or whether we use weighted averages to compute the
levels of signicance or not: the levels of significance are in all cases over 0.9999.14
Primary School Enrollment in 1960:
As was the case with almost all other variables analyzed the primary school enrollment rate in
1960 is labeled non-robust by the extreme bounds test. Column 4 suggests that this variable is
positively related to growth.  The levels of significance reported in Columns 6 and 7 suggest a
strong significance, although the unweighted average of individual CDFs (Column 8) is not as
strong.  
Life Expectancy in 1960:
Again, this variable is not robust according to extreme bounds test, even though it is significant in
over 96 percent of the regressions.  It is positively related to growth which suggests that human
capital affects growth positively.  The last three columns display strong significance regardless of
the measure adopted.  
(6)  INTRODUCING THE INVESTMENT RATE AS A FIXED VARIABLE
Table 2 repeats the estimation of all the regressions with one fundamental change: it
includes the average investment rate between 1960 and 1990 as a fixed variable appearing in all
regressions.  
Inspection of Table 2 suggests that, by and large, the main lessons we learned in Table 1
go through in that most of the variables that were significant in Table 1 are still significant in
Table 2.  There are, however, a few differences, which can be summarized as follows:
Variables that Were Significant When Investment was Excluded and are No Longer Significant.
These are variables that can be interpreted to have their effects on growth only through their
effects on the investment rate. The variables that are no longer significant are
(A) Revolutions and Coups and the War Dummy. These two variables affect growth but
only through their effect on the investment rate, perhaps they affect uncertainty, perhaps they
affect the rate of return.  But the truth is that, once the aggregate investment is held constant (and,15
therefore, once we net out the effects of these variables on investment), they are no longer
correlated with growth in a significant manner.
(B) Non-Equipment Investment.  Since in Table 1 we did not hold constant the investment
rate in any of the regressions and the data seem to want to have the aggregate investment rate, then
the non-equipment investment was significant.   Now that we are holding the aggregate investment
rate constant, the non-equipment is not significant.  Hence, there seems to be nothing special
about non-equipment investment in the sense that it does not matter once aggregate investment is
held constant.  
(C) Fraction of Buddhist and Catholic. 
Variables that were NOT significant when Investment was neglected but are significant now.
The variables in this category are:
(A) Public Investment Share.  This variable is significantly negative related with growth
once aggregate investment is held constant.  This suggests that public investment is less efficient
than  private investment so that, holding constant the aggregate, a larger fraction of public
investment is bad.  
(B) Age.  
(C) Standard Deviation of Domestic Credit.   
Finally, the last row of Table 2 analyzes the investment rate as an additional “tested” variable,
keeping the other three fixed variables and combining the remaing 59 variables in trios.  Once
again, the extreme bounds label for the investment rate is non-robust since columns (1) and (2)
have opposite signs, even though the variable is significant in 97.23% of the 32,509 regressions. 
The weighted average estimate of ￿  is 0.1093, and the significance values are above 0.99 in z
Columns (6), (7), and (8). 
(7) CONCLUSIONS
We are interested in knowing the coefficient of a particular variable in a growth regression. 16
Instead of looking at the two extreme bounds of the distribution of estimators of this coefficient,
we look at the entire distribution.  If we do this, the picture emerging from the empirical growth
literature is not the pessimistic “Nothing is Robust” picture that we get with the extreme bounds
analysis.  Instead, we find that a substantial number of variables can be found to be strongly
related to growth.17
Appendix 1: Description and Sources of Variables:
1 Equipment Investment.  See Delong and Summers (1991).
2 Number of Years Open Economy.  Index computed by Sachs and Warner (1996).
3 Fraction of Confucius.  Fraction of population that follows Confucius Religion (see Barro (1996)).
4 Rule of Law. See Barro (1996).
5 Fraction of Muslim. See Barro (1996).
6 Political Rights. See Barro (1996).
7 Latin American Dummy. Dummy for Latin American countries.
8 Sub-Sahara African Dummy. Dummy for Sub-Sahara African Countries.
9 Civil Liberties.  Index of civil liberties from Knack and Keefer (1995).
10 Revolutions and Coups. Number of military coups and revolutions.  (Barro and Lee (1995), from
now on BL93).
11 Fraction of GDP in Mining.  From Hall and Jones (1996).
12 S.D. Black Market Premium. Standard Deviation of Black Market Premium 1960-89. Levine &
Renelt (1992).
13 Primary Exports in 1970. Fraction of primary exports in total exports in 1970.  From Sachs and
Warner (1996b).
14 Degree of Capitalism.  Index of degree in which economies favor capitalist forms of production
from Hall and Jones (1996).
15 War Dummy. Dummy for countries that have been involved in war any time between 1960 and
1990.  BL93.
16 Non-Equipment Investment. See Delong and Summers (1991).
17 Absolute Lattitude.  See Barro (1996). 
18 Exch. Rate Distortions.  See BL93.
19 Fraction of Protestant. See Barro (1996).
20 Fraction of Buddhist. See Barro (1996).
21 Fraction of Catholic. See Barro (1996).
22 Spanish Colony. Dummy variable for former Spanish colonies.  See Barro (1996).
23 Public Investment Share. Investment Share as fraction of GDP (BL93).
24 Frac. Pop. Spk. English. Fraction of the popilation able to speak English.  From Hall and Jones
(1996). 
25 Defense Spending Share.  Public Expenditures in defence as fraction of GDP (BL93).
26 Age. Average age of the population. BL93. 
27 Public Consumption Share. Public consumption minus education and defense as fraction of GDP
(BL93).
28 Average Inflation Rate 60-90. See Levine and Renelt (1992).
29 Size Labor Force (Scale Effect). See BL93.
30 Frac. Pop. Spk. Foreign Language
31 Black Market Premium.  Log of (1+Black Market Premium). (BL93).
32 S.D. Inflation 60-90.  Standard Deviation of the Inflation Rate 1960-1990.  Levine and Renelt
(1992).
33 Growth Rate of Population. Average rate between 1960 and 1990. BL93.
34 Ratio Workers to Population. BL93.
35 Fraction of Jewish. See Barro (1996).
36 Liquid Liabilities to GDP. Ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP (a measure of financial development).
King and Levine (1993).
37 Avg. Years of Primary School. Average years of primary schooling of total population in 1960
(BL93).18
38 French Colony.  Dummy variable for former French colonies.  See Barro (1996).
39 Political Assassinations.  Number of political assationations.  Taken from BL93.
40 S.D. Domestic Credit.  Standard Deviation of Domestic Credit 1960-89 (King and Levine (1993)).
41 H*log(GDP60).  Product of average years of schooling and log of GDP per capita in 1960. (BL93).
42 Fraction of Hindu. See Barro (1996).
43 Avg. Years of Schooling = H. Average years of education of total population in 1960. (BL93).
44 Secondary School Enrollment.  See BL93.
45 Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization. Probability two random people in a country do not speak same
language. See Easterly and Levine (1996).
46 Outward Orientation.  Measure of outward orientation.  From Levine and Renelt (1992).
47 Index of Democracy 1965. Qualitative index of democratic freedom.  From Knack and Keefer
(1995). 
48 Tariff Restrictions.  Degree of tariff barriers.  From BL93.
49 Free Trade Openness. Measure of Free Trade. From BL93.
50 Avg. Years of Higher School. Average years of higher education of total population in 1960.
(BL93).
51 Avg. Years of Sec. School.  Average years of secondary schooling of total population in 1960
(BL93).
52 Political Instability.  From Knack and Keefer (1995).
53 Gov. Education Spending Share. Public Expenditures in education as fraction of GDP (BL93).
54 Higher Educ. Enrollment. Enrollment rates in higher education in 1960. (BL93).
55 British Colony.  Dummy variable for former British colonies.  See Barro (1996).
56 Urbanization Rate. Fraction of population living in cities.  See BL93.
57 Growth of Domestic Credit 60-90. Growth rate of domestic credit 1960-90. Levine and Renelt
(1992).
58 Area (Scale Effect).  Total area of the country. BL93.
59 Terms of Trade Growth. Growth of Terms of Trade between 1960 and 1990. BL93.
log(GDP per capita 1960). Log of Summers-Heston GDP per capita in 1960. From BL93.  
Life Expectancy.  Life expectancy in 1960 (BL93).
Primary School Enrollment.  Secondary School Enrollment Rate in 1960.  BL93. 19
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2 Number of Years Open Economy -0.0025 0.0438 99.97% 0.01948 0.00424 1.000 1.000 1.000
3 Fraction of Confucious 0.0038 0.1266 100.00% 0.06757 0.01492 1.000 1.000 1.000
4 Rule of Law -0.0124 0.0599 92.04% 0.01895 0.00492 1.000 1.000 0.993
5 Fraction of Muslim -0.0155 0.0368 88.67% 0.01421 0.00353 1.000 1.000 0.988
6 Political Rights -0.0134 0.0077 33.73% -0.00265 0.00087 0.999 0.998 0.926
7 Latin American Dummy -0.0354 0.0112 88.28% -0.01154 0.00291 1.000 0.998 0.986
8 Sub-Sahara African Dummy -0.0377 0.0174 76.38% -0.01212 0.00322 1.000 0.997 0.978
9 Civil Liberties -0.0113 0.0130 16.90% -0.00290 0.00102 0.998 0.997 0.848
10 Revolutions and Coups -0.0377 0.0358 2.81% -0.01179 0.00452 0.995 0.995 0.696
11 Fraction of GDP in Mining  -0.1654 0.1361 17.18% 0.03533 0.01383 0.995 0.994 0.729
12 S.D. Black Market Premium -0.0001 0.0000 35.29% -0.00003 0.00001 0.993 0.993 0.955
13 Primary Exports in 1970 -0.0450 0.0167 93.59% -0.01399 0.00526 0.996 0.990 0.993
14 Degree of Capitalism -0.0036 0.0089 51.03% 0.00184 0.00079 0.990 0.987 0.944
15 War Dummy -0.0168 0.0126 17.09% -0.00562 0.00233 0.992 0.984 0.870
16 Non-Equipment Investment -0.0633 0.2468 76.32% 0.05622 0.02424 0.990 0.982 0.978
17 Absolute Lattitude -0.0004 0.0009 66.20% 0.00023 0.00009 0.993 0.980 0.965
18 Exch. Rate Distortions -0.0003 0.0001 54.29% -0.00006 0.00003 0.975 0.968 0.958
19 Fraction of Protestant -0.0480 0.0172 57.07% -0.01286 0.00525 0.993 0.966 0.958
20 Fraction of Buddhist -0.0142 0.0554 92.47% 0.01485 0.00755 0.975 0.964 0.994
21 Fraction of Catholic -0.0305 0.0120 84.18% -0.00891 0.00341 0.996 0.963 0.984
22 Spanish Colony -0.0258 0.0286 45.42% -0.00647 0.00321 0.978 0.938 0.889
23 Public Investment Share -0.2309 0.2714 1.16% 0.04070 0.02758 0.930 0.915 0.691
24 Frac. Pop. Spk. English -0.0350 0.0166 27.29% -0.00682 0.00480 0.922 0.910 0.923
25 Defense Spending Share -0.2120 0.3269 16.30% -0.06417 0.04693 0.914 0.909 0.883
26 Age -0.0002 0.0001 15.10% -0.00004 0.00003 0.907 0.903 0.918
27 Public Consumption Share -0.2754 0.1040 35.60% -0.02205 0.01655 0.909 0.868 0.920
28 Average Inflation Rate 60-90 -0.0010 0.0005 6.56% -0.00002 0.00002 0.859 0.856 0.752
29 Size Labor Force (Scale Effect) -0.0003 0.0008 0.43% 0.00005 0.00005 0.846 0.835 0.744
30 Frac. Pop. Spk. Foreign Language -0.0162 0.0245 19.43% 0.00486 0.00304 0.945 0.831 0.843
31 Black Market Premium -0.0228 0.0381 3.36% -0.00391 0.00356 0.864 0.825 0.707
32 S.D. Inflation 60-90 -0.1664 0.2322 3.81% -0.00415 0.00465 0.814 0.811 0.560
33 Growth Rate of Population -1.2817 1.1651 0.31% 0.20409 0.18643 0.863 0.807 0.531
34 Ratio Workers to Population -0.0491 0.0456 21.75% 0.00482 0.00530 0.819 0.766 0.773
35 Fraction of Jewish -1.8490 1.0118 0.16% 0.00923 0.01371 0.750 0.747 0.617
36 Liquid Liabilities to GDP -0.0335 0.0802 69.32% 0.00819 0.01012 0.791 0.735 0.962
37 Avg. Years of Primary School -3.5131 7.9705 3.91% -0.00068 0.00117 0.720 0.704 0.811
38 French Colony -0.0238 0.0306 0.11% 0.00177 0.00315 0.713 0.702 0.650
39 Political Assassinations -0.1833 0.1587 0.02% 0.01338 0.02534 0.701 0.697 0.675
40 S.D. Domestic Credit -0.0004 0.0002 4.75% -0.00001 0.00001 0.696 0.696 0.715
41 H*log(GDP60) -0.0055 0.0040 2.25% -0.00006 0.00011 0.697 0.689 0.688
42 Fraction of Hindu -0.3100 0.1018 0.50% 0.00306 0.00764 0.656 0.654 0.524
43 Avg. Years of Schooling = H -7.9734 3.5109 0.85% -0.00038 0.00100 0.646 0.653 0.623
44 Secondary School Enrollment -0.0598 0.0771 2.47% -0.00438 0.01058 0.661 0.649 0.711
45 Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization -0.0302 0.0253 0.64% -0.00183 0.00457 0.655 0.643 0.614
46 Outward Orientation -0.0097 0.0157 2.51% -0.00081 0.00233 0.635 0.634 0.794
47 Index of Democracy 1965 -0.0402 0.0233 17.73% -0.00176 0.00498 0.638 0.633 0.890
48 Tariff Restrictions -0.5715 0.4344 0.53% 0.01793 0.05657 0.624 0.624 0.670
49 Free Trade Openness -0.1042 0.1490 3.84% -0.00568 0.01893 0.618 0.617 0.818
50 Avg. Years of Higher School -3.5045 7.9721 0.01% -0.00357 0.01416 0.600 0.597 0.643
51 Avg. Years of Sec. School -3.5069 7.9789 2.94% 0.00061 0.00259 0.593 0.592 0.800
52 Political Instability -0.0684 0.1024 0.30% -0.00193 0.01059 0.572 0.581 0.588
53 Gov. Education Spending Share -0.6854 0.7519 0.53% 0.02822 0.12604 0.589 0.580 0.677
54 Higher Educ. Enrollment -0.1833 0.2323 0.01% -0.00692 0.03290 0.583 0.579 0.543
55 British Colony -0.0180 0.0133 1.25% -0.00047 0.00232 0.581 0.579 0.612
56 Urbanization Rate -0.0438 0.0520 1.01% -0.00156 0.00825 0.575 0.577 0.746
57 Growth of Domestic Credit 60-90 -0.0005 0.0008 0.02% -0.00001 0.00004 0.565 0.565 0.542
58 Area (Scale Effect) -0.0031 0.0043 0.02% 0.00005 0.00064 0.532 0.532 0.539
59 Terms of Trade Growth -0.3437 0.2348 0.05% 0.00129 0.04117 0.512 0.511 0.628
Number of Regressions = 32509
VARIABLES NOT TESTED
log(GDP per capita 1960) -0.0336 0.0009 99.98% -0.01325 0.00230 1.000 1.000 1.000
Primary School Enrollment, 1960 -0.0384 0.0680 47.58% 0.01793 0.00683 0.996 0.992 0.899
Life Expectancy, 1960 -0.0008 0.0029 96.30% 0.00083 0.00023 1.000 0.999 0.996
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TABLE 1: MAIN RESULTSNumber of Regressions = 30,856 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lower Upper Fraction Standard CDF CDF CDF 
NAME OF TESTED VARIABLE Extreme Extreme Significant Beta Deviation Normal Non-Normal Non-Normal
(Weighted) (No Weight)
1 Number of Years Open Economy 0.0001 0.0402 100.00% 0.01790 0.00380 1.000 1.000 1.000
2 Fraction of Confucious 0.0048 0.1157 100.00% 0.05891 0.01403 1.000 1.000 1.000
3 Rule of Law -0.0109 0.0587 88.42% 0.01616 0.00457 1.000 0.999 0.991
4 Fraction of Muslim -0.0152 0.0340 71.69% 0.01139 0.00314 1.000 0.999 0.974
5 Political Rights -0.0127 0.0072 58.38% -0.00270 0.00079 1.000 0.999 0.963
6 Exch. Rate Distortions -0.0003 0.0001 87.69% -0.00008 0.00003 0.999 0.998 0.987
7 Civil Liberties -0.0112 0.0118 44.42% -0.00299 0.00091 0.999 0.997 0.921
8 Absolute Lattitude -0.0003 0.0008 76.43% 0.00023 0.00008 0.998 0.996 0.979
9 Sub-Sahara African Dummy -0.0356 0.0232 82.40% -0.00993 0.00284 1.000 0.996 0.982
10 Latin American Dummy -0.0356 0.0098 72.95% -0.00836 0.00267 0.999 0.994 0.975
11 Equipment Investment -0.1357 0.6459 87.90% 0.12872 0.04947 0.995 0.992 0.990
12 Degree of Capitalism -0.0030 0.0088 71.20% 0.00178 0.00072 0.994 0.991 0.973
13 Fraction of Protestant -0.0456 0.0156 65.93% -0.01070 0.00447 0.992 0.983 0.969
14 Primary Exports in 1970 -0.0431 0.0157 93.93% -0.01128 0.00479 0.991 0.979 0.993
15 Age -0.0002 0.0001 23.91% -0.00005 0.00003 0.971 0.964 0.934
16 S.D. Domestic Credit -0.0004 0.0001 20.16% -0.00002 0.00001 0.960 0.959 0.925
17 Public Investment Share -0.2907 0.2646 54.32% -0.05257 0.03057 0.957 0.946 0.948
18 Defense Spending Share -0.2119 0.2666 3.02% -0.07141 0.04610 0.939 0.921 0.787
19 Size Labor Force (Scale Effect) -0.0002 0.0008 5.41% 0.00006 0.00004 0.924 0.915 0.868
20 S.D. Black Market Premium -0.0001 0.0000 0.17% -0.00002 0.00001 0.917 0.908 0.827
21 Frac. Pop. Spk. English -0.0307 0.0165 21.44% -0.00592 0.00427 0.917 0.902 0.897
22 Public Consumption Share -0.2456 0.1083 40.43% -0.02011 0.01567 0.900 0.877 0.932
23 Spanish Colony -0.0218 0.0285 7.90% -0.00403 0.00293 0.915 0.875 0.808
24 Fraction of Buddhist -0.0148 0.0474 75.27% 0.00914 0.00692 0.907 0.874 0.978
25 Fraction of Catholic -0.0262 0.0153 27.15% -0.00420 0.00309 0.913 0.871 0.916
26 Avg. Years of Sec. School -4.5621 6.0114 6.15% 0.00214 0.00216 0.839 0.833 0.862
27 Growth Rate of Population -1.3714 0.8799 1.40% 0.20029 0.17100 0.879 0.831 0.729
28 Urbanization Rate -0.0384 0.0504 3.24% 0.00779 0.00747 0.852 0.821 0.829
29 Revolutions and Coups -0.0339 0.0399 1.63% -0.00451 0.00452 0.841 0.820 0.645
30 Higher Educ. Enrollment -0.1645 0.2388 1.90% 0.02776 0.02992 0.823 0.820 0.848
31 Fraction of GDP in Mining  -0.1951 0.1379 9.51% 0.01238 0.01368 0.817 0.811 0.677
32 Non-Equipment Investment -0.1039 0.2011 0.89% 0.02473 0.02621 0.827 0.801 0.609
33 Area (Scale Effect) -0.0027 0.0043 0.27% 0.00043 0.00056 0.777 0.775 0.723
34 Political Assassinations -0.1524 0.1523 0.01% 0.01725 0.02271 0.776 0.771 0.527
35 Avg. Years of Higher School -4.5584 6.0084 0.03% 0.00831 0.01227 0.751 0.750 0.698
36 S.D. Inflation 60-90 -0.2348 0.1782 0.74% -0.00282 0.00411 0.754 0.747 0.538
37 Free Trade Openness -0.1028 0.1282 0.90% -0.01230 0.01832 0.749 0.746 0.737
38 Fraction of Jewish -1.4276 1.3103 0.02% 0.00812 0.01219 0.747 0.745 0.634
39 Tariff Restrictions -0.5951 0.4205 0.24% 0.03553 0.05507 0.741 0.737 0.622
40 Black Market Premium -0.0191 0.0373 1.65% -0.00366 0.00408 0.816 0.732 0.509
41 Average Inflation Rate 60-90 -0.0008 0.0007 0.87% -0.00001 0.00002 0.726 0.723 0.656
42 Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization -0.0266 0.0257 0.47% -0.00258 0.00411 0.735 0.722 0.643
43 Frac. Pop. Spk. Foreign Language -0.0144 0.0207 4.62% 0.00149 0.00265 0.713 0.689 0.762
44 Outward Orientation -0.0103 0.0144 0.13% -0.00108 0.00208 0.699 0.687 0.625
45 Political Instability -0.0646 0.0973 0.51% 0.00453 0.00963 0.681 0.667 0.642
46 War Dummy -0.0149 0.0149 0.55% -0.00122 0.00218 0.713 0.666 0.627
47 H*log(GDP60) -0.0046 0.0046 0.38% 0.00004 0.00009 0.662 0.662 0.516
48 Growth of Domestic Credit 60-90 -0.0005 0.0008 0.05% -0.00002 0.00004 0.661 0.661 0.506
49 Terms of Trade Growth -0.3264 0.2199 0.17% -0.01767 0.03889 0.675 0.661 0.716
50 Liquid Liabilities to GDP -0.0365 0.0759 37.86% 0.00518 0.00999 0.698 0.654 0.914
51 Avg. Years of Schooling = H -6.0061 4.5661 0.48% 0.00029 0.00078 0.643 0.643 0.544
52 Index of Democracy 1965 -0.0361 0.0233 5.29% -0.00145 0.00499 0.614 0.609 0.823
53 French Colony -0.0229 0.0260 0.00% -0.00028 0.00286 0.540 0.539 0.609
54 Avg. Years of Primary School -4.5672 6.0041 0.61% 0.00009 0.00098 0.536 0.537 0.680
55 Ratio Workers to Population -0.0420 0.0486 4.22% 0.00057 0.00443 0.552 0.528 0.670
56 Fraction of Hindu -0.2893 0.1016 1.00% 0.00044 0.00686 0.526 0.523 0.505
57 Gov. Education Spending Share -0.6887 0.6717 0.02% -0.00476 0.11253 0.517 0.514 0.527
58 Secondary School Enrollment -0.0560 0.0634 1.25% 0.00024 0.00927 0.510 0.514 0.703
59 British Colony -0.0178 0.0108 1.40% -0.00003 0.00206 0.506 0.504 0.673
Number of Regressions = 32,509
VARIABLE NOT TESTED
Investment Rate (1960-1990) -0.1109 0.2699 97.23% 0.10930 0.01855 1.000 1.000 0.998
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TABLE 2: 
RESULTS WHEN THE INVESTMENT IS INCLUDED AS A FIXED VARIABLE